

The 'Fijian Dilemma': The Revolving Door Syndrome in Ethnic Fijian Rural Development, 1950s-1987

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Abstract

This paper seeks to revive discourse on Fiji's rural development history. It focuses on the nexus of vakamatanitu, vakavanua, ethnic-preference and traditionalism in rural development policies of the colonial administration and the Alliance government. The paper aims to provide a more holistic view of, what Nayacakalau called, the 'Fijian dilemma', in rural development. It identifies two underlying rural development principles - traditionalism and ethnic-preference - and links these to vakamatanitu and vakavanua. It is argued that these four complementary concepts have informed the state's approach to rural development in the colonial period and beyond. Elite manipulation of the four concepts to drive rural development translated into ethnic demarcation of agricultural production, the grid-locking of rural Fijian farmers into semi-subsistence and marginal-profit agriculture, and the perpetuation of past mistakes (revolving door syndrome) by the state in the post-colonial period.

Introduction

Fiji's rural development history is characterized by a set of continuities and ironies steeped in colonial legacy and perpetuated in the post-colonial decades. The element of continuity in this history was manifest in several ways. First, debates on indigenous Fijian economic development in the Legislative Council and at the Council of Chiefs meetings have reflected a resolute adherence by the Fijian ruling class to traditionalism in rural development against calls for democratizing the Fijian orthodoxy.¹ Same debates have persisted to the present as the local dailies

¹ Berger *et al* (1974: 147) define *traditionalism* as 'an ambition to combine development and modernization with the protection of traditional symbols and patterns of life'. The *Fijian orthodoxy* established by Gordon codified native communal land ten-

and Hansard records confirm.

Second, the vast majority of agricultural diversification projects from the 1950s have proved unsustainable. These thrived on the four complementary concepts: traditionalism, *vakamatanitu*, *vakavanua*, and ethnic-preference. Cocoa and other diversification projects established with Colonial Development and Welfare (CD&W) Grants from 1950 to 1969 either failed to 'take-off' or became insolvent in the long haul. So did the majority of overseas-aided rural projects implemented by the Alliance government after independence.

Third, crop diversification projects were touted by the colonial administration and its immediate successor, the Alliance government, as the best means for redistributing the fruits of development and raising rural incomes. Underpinned by ethnic-preference and traditionalism, such pronouncements have remained rhetorical and abstract, paying lip service to sustainable rural development. In the 1960s, the colonial government implemented three key policy reforms in its rural development approach: the relaxation of native regulations, the enactment of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act in 1966, and the establishment of resettlement schemes which relocated Fijian farmers in farming settlements. These reforms did little to spur the hoped-for economic growth of the rural *vanua* because the overarching rural development philosophy was driven by *vakavanua*, *vakamatanitu*, ethnic-preference and traditionalism.²

Overton (1999) provides an interesting discussion of Fiji's long-standing paternalistic/state-led (*vakamatanitu*) rural development agenda. He argues that the *vakamatanitu* approach complements the indigenous Fijian concept of *vakavanua* development. Although pertinent, his discussion does not connect all the dots. He does not mention traditionalism and ethnic-preference, two essential elements of the *vakamatanitu* and *vakavanua* rural development approach.

ure and established a separate Fijian Administration (France 1969: 127). The concept of *vakavanua* pushes the belief that indigenous Fijian economic development should always be pursued within the ambits of the Fijian orthodoxy and that semi subsistence and village-based/communal methods of agricultural production must be promoted to preserve the orthodoxy.

² The concept of *vanua* embraces multiple contexts. One context defines it as the indigenous traditional socio-cultural order, the land and its people. Imbued with a certain amount of symbolism, this context also perceives *vanua* as an inalienable indigenous Fijian heritage. *Vanua* also encapsulates the indigenous Fijian social order governed by the separate Fijian Administration. In some instances, the word *vanua* is synonymous with the rural Fijian village system. Literally, the concept refers to land in general as a natural resource.

This paper seeks to provide a holistic view of how the promotion of the four concepts (*vakamatanitu*, *vakavanua*, traditionalism, and ethnic-preference) in agricultural diversification projects (from the 1940s on) locked the rural *vanua* into less lucrative and marginal agricultural production. It also examines the political orientations of rural projects implemented before independence. Traditionalism (vigorously promoted by the Fijian ruling class since the late 1940s) and ethnic-preference shaped the colonial government's approach to rural development. The approach was regressive because it de-prioritized infrastructure development for the rural *vanua* and impeded its integration with the emergent modern sector. The rural *vanua* has been economically-disadvantaged because it remained locked into low-profit semi-subsistence agriculture predicated on communal/village-based production. Like those launched in the colonial period, many large-scale, exclusionary agricultural projects between 1971 and 1987 were miserable failures. Although these projects were touted as measures to raise rural incomes, they did not mainstream the rural *vanua* into the profit-yielding sectors of the economy. This failure translated into lacklustre rural livelihoods and rural stagnation.

Rural Stagnation: The Historical Context of the Problem

Rural stagnation is universally linked to 'urban drift'. In Fiji's case, this problem was clearly articulated by Oscar Spate (1959: 39) in his survey of the prospects of indigenous Fijian economic development between 1946 and 1958:

...in so far as village agriculture is concerned, there has, over the period under review, been a steady flow of younger able-bodied men to the towns....It is estimated that on the main islands about one-quarter of the able-bodied men have left their villages to seek work elsewhere. It may be assumed that these represent the more ambitious and energetic section of the population and that village farming has suffered accordingly.

Spate's discussion was focused on what he and his team identified as an emergent trend of agrarian stagnation. He linked this phenomenon to consistent increases in sugarcane production: 'during the past 10 years the continued extension of sugar-cane growing has been responsible for reducing the area under maize and peanuts and, to a lesser extent, tobacco and pulses, from a total of 12,000 acres to 2,500 acres' (1959: 35).

Spate, however, held back from connecting rural stagnation to all the four concepts underpinning the colonial government's rural development approach.

At that point in time (1950s), there was already a discernible ethnic demarcation in agricultural production where indigenous Fijian farmers were predominantly engaged in less lucrative agricultural production.³ Indo-Fijian farmers were primarily engaged in the booming sector (sugar industry) while rural indigenous Fijians were locked into marginal profit, semi-subsistence agriculture. Table 1 compares the acreages under marketable crops by ethnic participation in 1958.

Table 1: Acreages under Crops 1958

Crop	Total Acreage	Fijian	Indian	European/Part-European	Chinese & Others
Sugar-cane	128,863	8,448	118,184	2,231	-
Coconuts	168,000	84,000	5,000	76,000	3,000
Bananas	5,000	4,600	380	20	-
Rice	31,200	400	30,150	250	400
Roots (Food)	35,933	31,696	2,877	-	1,300
All Other Crops	9,997	4,860	3,672	210	1,300
TOTAL	378,993	134,004	160,218	78,711	6,060
Approximate Farming Pop.		28,000	23,000	600	950

Note: All other crops include vegetables, fruit, cocoa, pulses, tobacco, etc. Figures are based on the 1956 Census. (Source: Spate 1959: 35)

Ward expounded this ethnic demarcation in his survey of land use patterns in Fiji:

The distinction which may be drawn between the almost fully-commercial economy and individualistic society of the Indian and European communities and the partly-commercial, partly-subsistence agriculture of the Fijian villages is mirrored in the contrast between the two distinct forms of land tenure found in the colony (1965: 9).

Ward observed that in 1956, 69.5 percent of all ethnic Fijian males engaged in industry were involved in agriculture and that 87.4 percent of this segment comprised semi-subsistence farmers (1965: 195). The main crops in semi-subsistence agriculture in the last two decades before independence were coconuts, bananas, yaqona (*piper methysticum*) and root crops (tapioca, taro and yams).

³ These crops earned much less revenue than sugar on the export market. Although taro exports only began to increase slightly after independence, these remained marginal income earners.

Cocoa projects, partly funded by Colonial Development and Welfare (CD & W) Grants, were introduced in 1953 as part of the colonial government's crop diversification program.⁴ Cocoa production grew at a sluggish rate; cocoa acreage increased from a total of 50 acres in 1952 to 1500 acres in 1958 and 5801 acres in 1969. These projects were within the *vanua* ambit, thus were not fully commercial. They were mostly for mixed tree cropping with coconuts and involved communal/village production rather than fully-commercial plantation systems (Spate 1959: 148; DP 6: 128). In contrast, copra estates owned by European settlers and part-Europeans were commercial plantations and were, therefore, more profitable than village-based copra ventures. Table 2 shows the acreages of production and exports of principal crops in 1958.

Table 2: Acreage and Exports of Principal Crops, 1958

Crops	Acreage Cultivated	% of Total Cultivated Area	Value of Produce Exported (£F, f.o.b)	% of Total Export Trade (Domestic Produce)
Sugar Cane	128,863	34.00	7,806,837	63.75
Coconuts	168,000	44.33	2,439,970	19.93
Bananas	5,000	1.32	163,192	1.33
All other crops	77,130	20.35	59,102	0.48
Total	373,993	100.00	10,469,101	85.49

(Source: Spate 1959: 147)

Although Spate (1959: 56) noted that plantation yields for copra surpassed village production outputs, the colonial government persisted in promoting village/semi-subsistence production because of its capitulation to the traditionalism of the Fijian ruling class. Table 2.0 clearly shows the marginality of export earnings for crops produced by Fijian farmers within the *vanua* ambit.

Echoing some of Spate's observations, Ward (1965: 15) linked the urban drift by rural ethnic Fijians to impediments to commercial enterprise embedded in the village orthodoxy:

Among the Fijians, the majority of whom have access to land they could use, the disincentives to individual enterprise which stem from the traditional socio-economic system are a major factor encouraging young people to leave their land and villages and move into the towns. In many interior areas lack of ready access to markets for cash crops prevents Fijians from

⁴ Other crops introduced to diversify agricultural output included bananas, maize and peanuts.

earning money locally and this adds to the incentive for moving to the towns.

Fijian farmers' incomes remained marginal as their mode of production (semi-subsistence) and choice of crops, failed to generate optimum revenue. Spate (1959: 39) points to the findings of the 1956 Census which revealed that of all Fijian farmers, 32.8 percent were copra producers, 12.4 percent cultivated bananas while a mere 0.2 percent produced sugarcane. Although the Colonial Sugar Refinery (CSR) Company had shown interest in raising levels of ethnic Fijian participation in sugarcane farming, little effort was made by the Fijian ruling class and/or the colonial administration to increase ethnic Fijian involvement in the more lucrative sugar industry.

Ethnic-Preference and Traditionalism: The Dilemmas of Rural Development in Fiji, 1950-1970

Ethnic-preference was an important principle informing the colonial government's rural development approach. The ethnic-preference approach to development, implemented by the British colonial administration in its 'plural society' colonies, was an administrative platform underpinned by the 'divide and rule' agenda. This administrative framework suited Britain's indirect rule over her colonies. Consequently, the primary objective of rural development projects was geared more to bridging perceived inter-ethnic economic gaps rather than the rural-urban divide. Some policy analysts have focused on how ethnic preference policies for minimizing colonial administrative costs have fuelled inter-ethnic competition over 'scarce' resources in post-colonial settings.⁵ In Malaysia, policies that sought to correct perceived inter-ethnic disparities became an issue of contention in the immediate post-colonial period. In Fiji's case, although the Indo-Fijian segment has not contested the ethnic-preference program until 2001, indigenous political parties (Fijian Association, Alliance, *Soqosoqo Vakavulewa ni Taukei*, *Matanitu Vanua* and the *Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewevanua*) have all in various ways politicized the ethnic-preference agenda in their pre-election manifestos.⁶

⁵ Policy analysts include Rothschild (1986: 15-52) who focused on colonial 'overrule' in African states; and Milne (1981) who examined the ethnic-preference policies in Malaysia, Guyana and Fiji. Ethnic-preference in this context refers to the adoption of 'protector/guardian (of the interests and traditional institutions of the native people) role by the colonial government.

⁶ From 2001, the Fiji Labour Party began questioning the constitutional legality of the

In Fiji, the approach was masked as a quest to bridge income disparities between ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians.⁷ The ethnic-preference dimension of *vakamatanitu* and *vakania* rural development was rationalized by allusions to a growing disparity in levels of ethnic participation in the economy. Surveys of the economic prospects of the ethnic Fijian population by McDougall (1956), Spate (1959) and Burns (1960) spotlighted significant disparities in levels of participation and representation in commerce by the ethnic-Fijians and Indo-Fijians. Spate, for example, writes:

This plural society is increasing rapidly and unequally in numbers without a commensurate increase in basic production....Against the Fijian half-share in copra and whole share of bananas must be set Indian dominance in cane, the most rewarding crop with export values twice those of the other two put together. There is also the ever-visible evidence of increasing Indian wealth from secondary industry and services (1959: 5).⁸

Statistics on ethnic representation in the formal and commercial sectors endorsed Spate's allusions to the inter-ethnic economic gap. Special ethnic-preference measures were implemented by the colonial government to mainstream ethnic Fijian participation in quasi-commercial rural projects. Grounded in quasi-commercial agriculture, the ethnic-preference program facilitated some institutional reforms which targeted ethnic Fijians exclusively. The Cooperative Societies Ordinance was enacted in 1947 to launch the colonial government's ethnic-preference agenda. Financial incentive funds to aid ethnic Fijian participation in agricultural projects were established. Pools of finance established included the Fijian Development Fund (FDF), the Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board (AILB) and *i lavo musuki ni yasana* (provincial levies).⁹ Economic De-

ethnic-preference program.

⁷ See Kaplan (1988: 101-106) for an interesting discussion of how British 'Divide and Rule' policies fostered the contrasts between ethnic Fijian communal traditionalism and Indo-Fijian commercialism based on individual enterprise.

⁸ The Spate (1959) and Burns *et al* (1960) reports were the most significant studies of the economic prospects and problems of ethnic Fijians. McDougall's (1956) report also highlighted the socio-economic disparities.

⁹ Both (the AILB and the FDF) were introduced in 1951. Although the Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board had tried to boost ethnic Fijian participation in commerce by offering loans for commercial agricultural ventures to ethnic Fijians, the percentages of loans provided to Indo-Fijian farmers remained much higher than the percentage of loans sought by ethnic Fijian applicants.

velopment Officers were appointed to mediate between the central government and the separate Fijian administration on ethnic Fijian business ventures.

Regrettably, these early measures to mainstream ethnic Fijian farmers in commercial enterprise were constrained by the colonial government's overarching rural development approach. The objective of the Cooperative Societies Ordinance (1947) - to foster the transition of rural ethnic Fijians from subsistence to quasi-commercial farmers - proved futile; although some successes were recorded, many cooperatives failed, forcing colonial planners to revise their expectations (Young 1984: 5).

Later, the Alliance government attempted to address this failure by shifting emphasis to producer cooperatives in Development Plan 7. This saw the establishment of the National Marketing Authority under DP7. The NMA was reorganized into the National Trading Corporation (NATCO) between 1987 and 1992. Again, this producer cooperative was faced with insolvency in the late 1990s. Spate (1959), Burns (1960), Belshaw (1964), Watters (1969) and Nayacakalou (1975) have all in various ways provided valuable insights on the primordial/socio-cultural factors impeding indigenous economic development. These failed rural ventures were constrained by traditionalism because they operated within the ambits of the *vanua*.

The colonial government's rural development approach was also undeniably driven by the traditionalism of the Fijian ruling class. In his discussion of how traditionalism hinders modernization in developing countries, Rogers suggests that Third World ruling classes are often reluctant to reform existing social structures. He argues that while they may publicly articulate aspirations to modernize their social milieu, they often oppose calls for their democratization because their power bases, vested in these colonially-restructured institutions and traditions could be jeopardized:

Why do aspirations outrun actualities in many emerging nations? One reason lies with the use of mass media in less developed countries....A second reason is that, in less developed nations, power often lies in the hands of oligarchs who dominate the national economic and political life. These latter-day Junkers, who often give public lip service to development goals, have proved generally reluctant to endorse programs that alter or upset the *status quo* (Rogers, 1969: 12-13).

Ethnic Fijian leaders at the helm of the Council of Chiefs were the equivalent of latter-day Junkers because they ardently touted a traditional-

ist ethos that sought to preserve the *status quo*. Spate (1959: 5) had argued that 'the traditional social environment of the Fijian' was a formidable obstacle to their economic development but the chiefs' council continued to push for a non-intrusive approach to the rural *vanua*. This positing for minimal development intervention can best be seen as an insistence on preserving the status quo (semi-subsistence and subservience to the separate Fijian Administration of the rural *vanua*). The Council of Chiefs told the Burns Commission in 1959 that it was possible to promote ethnic Fijian economic development within the parameters of traditional institutions and customs. This representation was focused on the Fijian village system. Nayacakalou (1975: 133-7) aptly described this traditionalist aspiration as 'the Fijian dilemma'.¹⁰ Watters, whose study focused on economic development and social changes in four Fijian villages, notes:

Many of the preconditions for growth are absent precisely because of cultural barriers....In general, traditional patterns of culture are unsuited to modern economic development, because like many non-Western cultures, they evolved out of a non-cash economy in which few commodities possessed great liquidity in exchange transactions (1969: 259).¹¹

But despite his acknowledgement of the primordial roadblocks to Fijian economic development, he pushed the traditionalist bandwagon by recommending an amalgamation of traditional and modern leadership to boost quasi-commercial enterprises within the *vanua* ambit (Watters, 1969: 218-9).

In his ground-breaking study of the colonial establishment of Gordon's 'Fijian orthodoxy', France (1969) provides meaningful insights on the philosophy propping up 'indirect rule' in Fiji. He observes that Gordon's orthodoxy emphasized:

... the subservience of the individual to his community, as part of the communal system; preserving the outward show of respect to the chiefs...; insistence on the communal ownership of land... and, above all, the maintenance of respect for customs which were held to be ancient, hallowed and unchanging (1969: 127).¹²

¹⁰ Also see Rutz (1987) for a discussion of the Fijian dilemma, which he labels 'moral ironies'.

¹¹ The four villages studied by Watters were Nalotawa, Sorolevu and Lutu on Viti Levu, and Nacamaki on Koro island in the Lomaiviti Group.

¹² Gordon's orthodoxy or native governance formula facilitated the codification of ex-

He argued that these tenets of traditionalism were 'propagated by the colonial government' and that they have been 'absorbed into the national consciousness where they inhibit progress' (1969: 174). His work has been the seminal point for contemporary analyses of the Fijian dilemma.¹³

Durutalo (1985), Lawson (1990), Jolly (1992), and Sutherland (1992), among others, have interpreted ethnic Fijian traditionalism as a movement manipulated by eastern Fijian chiefs to protect their colonially-derived power bases.¹⁴ Their analyses perceive the 'Fijian Dilemma' as a product of the political manoeuvring of an eastern oligarchy backed by the colonial government and capitalist forces.

Between 1905 and the 1940s, the colonial government seemingly veered away from traditionalism when it flaunted rhetoric on *galala*.¹⁵ The policy of exempting indigenous Fijians from communalism was mooted by the colonial government in the first decade of the 20th century. This policy was contradictory because it aimed at preserving the Fijian orthodoxy while promoting individualism among exempted indigenous Fijians to equip them for modernity. The two stances are antithetical. Im Thurn, governor from 1904 to 1908, played a significant role in promoting the policy of exempting Fijians from the communal fold for a period of one year. This policy was driven by the Native Lands Ordinance of 1905, which sought to free-up unused native lands. Im Thurn was supported by some agriculturalists who perceived an antithesis between communalism and economic progress.¹⁶

isting native communal land boundaries and a standard social hierarchy 'stretching from the village council to the Council of Chiefs' (France 1969 127).

¹³ Neo-Marxist and political economy interpretations of class dynamics in Fiji have commonly emphasized that the notion of 'Fijian homogeneity' had its origins in Gordon's orthodoxy (Plange 1990; Sutherland 1992; Durutalo 1985). Derrick (1957 23) had earlier pointed to the absence of a trans/pan-Fijian chiefly power construct in pre-colonial times. Legge (1958 282) similarly argued that 'the conception of native society as an integrated society may be common today, but it was not so when Gordon went to Fiji'. West (1966 267) stated that there was 'no precedent for a single, united Fijian society during pre-contact times'.

¹⁴ Lasaqa (1984) and Ravuvu (1987) have been identified as apologists for the Fijian ruling class as their studies idealized and defended the Fijian orthodoxy.

¹⁵ *Galala* (in relation to ethnic Fijian participation in the Fijian orthodoxy) means liberation from one's *vanua* obligations or emancipation from the shackles of communalism. See Bayliss-Simth & Haynes (1989) for a discussion of the Lomaivuna Banana scheme.

¹⁶ Im Thurn's predecessors, O'Brien and Jackson, had endorsed the *galala* policy. Henry May and Bickham Escott (Im Thurn's successors) also supported the reform (Post-War and Development Committee 1948: 136; Minutes of the Council of Chiefs

However, a reversal to revive traditionalism emerged in the 1940s as resistance to *galala* by ethnic Fijian leaders mounted. At the prodding of prominent members of the Fijian ruling class, the colonial government began to reverse its stance. Advocating resistance to *galala*, a chief of Tokatoka in Tailevu, Ravuama Vunivalu, once also a member of the Legislative Council, asserted that quasi-commercial agricultural projects could be accommodated within the communal fold: 'With proper guidance and help it should be possible for these organizations to fit in very well into the Fijian social and economic structure' (Journal of the Legislative Council Sessions of 1940: 12).

Endorsing this traditionalist stance, the Governor, opening the Council of Chiefs meeting in 1944, admonished his august audience:

There is ... one matter of which I wish to make special mention and that is the vexatious problem of 'exempted Fijians'.... The Fijian has communal obligations such as house building ... and so on....nothing could be more disastrous to the race than the breaking up of that system. The 'exemption' policy must lead to a break-up of the social system ... (Minutes of the Council of Chiefs Meeting, 1944: 3).

Also contributing to debates on the *galala* policy in 1946, the Post-War Planning and Development Committee was critical of the 'burden-some nature' of the *galala* policy:

In Fijian society every adult male is required to cultivate sufficient land to ensure crops adequate for the requirements of himself and those dependent upon him. The Provincial Council is empowered to make and pass resolutions to provide for the times and manner in which such crops shall be planted.... There is no machinery for enforcing similar obligations on 'exempted' Fijians.... The Agricultural Department has to deal with the 'exempted' Fijians as individuals and this absorbs an undue amount of the time of Agricultural Officers....If the system were extended to its logical conclusion it would mean a breakdown of Fijian organization with repercussions throughout every government department (Post-War Planning and Development Committee 1948: 136).

This rhetoric misrepresents facts because it blames *galala* for the neglect of village agronomy by extension staff, when in fact the colonial government (at the behest of the Fijian ruling class) discouraged disrup-

Meetings (1903, 1911, 1914); Lal, 1992:29-30; Macnaught, 1982:21-37; Frazer, 1975: 88-93).

tions to the communal order by 'change agents'. *Galala* posed a threat to the Fijian orthodoxy and the power bases of the Fijian chiefs. Nonetheless, anti-exemption rhetoric like this formed the basis of the traditionalist ethos which was later embraced and perpetuated by the Alliance government after independence.

Ethnic-preference and traditionalism in the rural development agenda of the colonial government were driven by the resolute resistance of the Fijian ruling class to *galala*. Debates on *galala* were rekindled in the mid-20th century by Spate:

It is my firm conviction that for the Fijian countryside the objective should be a community of independent farmers, living or working on holdings heritable and alienable at least between Fijians, but retaining in each village or Old *Tikina* a common centre-church, school, guesthouse, parish hall, chiefly residence (1959: 101).

Spate argued that *galala* provided leeway to enterprising farmers to develop a mindset conducive to economic development. Burns echoed Spate:

[I] agree in general with what [Spate] has to say...and we do not therefore propose to reiterate them in this Report. We should, however, say this.... traditional attitudes and behaviour in the rural areas, particularly among the leaders of the people, [is] still a major obstacle in the way of technological change and there is a reluctance, if not a failure, to grasp the present-day economic situation (1960: 38).

Burns went a step further to suggest that the government's paternalism (*yakamatanitu*) was an impediment to Fijian economic enterprise:

We do not blame the Fijians for this so much as the Government and the Legislature for so long adopting a paternalistic attitude and for still giving a very high priority to fostering, at this period of the 20th century, "the continuance of the Fijian communal system and the customs and observances traditionally associated with that system" (1960: 38).

The Council of Chiefs accepted non-controversial reforms recommended by Spate and Burns but remained resolute against those that sought to democratize the Fijian Administration. Pandering to the chiefs' council, the colonial government delayed its response until 1967 when two reforms were legislated.¹⁷

¹⁷ One of these abolished the post of *Buli* (district overseers) in 1967, replacing it with

Discussing the economic potentials of *galala*, Frazer later noted that 'the mean per capita output of the independent [*galala*] farmers was much higher than that of the villagers. Their cane output per head was twice that of the non-exempted Fijian growers' (1973: 90).

Despite this pronouncement after independence, the Alliance government persisted with the four-pronged rural development approach of its predecessor.

Several failed crop diversification projects (copra, cocoa and banana) exclusive to ethnic Fijian farmers, were established between 1950 and 1970. Their traditionalist platforms, which opted for semi-subsistence farming within the communal fold, kept farmers' incomes marginal and hindered full integration with the modern economy.¹⁸ Rallying to calls by the Council of Chiefs against disruptions to the rural *vanua*, the colonial government did not prop up these projects with basic infrastructure to enhance the living standards of the participant communities. Investments of CD&W grants on infrastructure for these projects aimed at easing resource extraction and enhancing links to the main domestic markets. These investments did not represent a concerted push to improve the living standards of the rural *vanua* from where resources were extracted.

The CD&W grants from the U.K. played a crucial role in Fiji's development between 1949 and 1970. These grants accounted for 25 per cent of the government's expenditure on capital projects. Table 3 shows the main sources of finance for Development Plans One to Four (1949-1968).

Table 3: Sources of Finance for Development Plans 1-4 (1949-1968)
(per cent share)

	1949-58 (DP 1)	1956-60 (DP 2)	1961-65 (DP 3)	1964-68 (DP 4)
CD & W Grants	27.4	10.5	54.3	18.3
Other External Aid	-	-	-	23.4
Local Revenue	25.6	9.6	-	15.0
Loans	47.0	79.9	45.7	43.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(Source: DP 6, 1970: 5)

government bureaucrats (District Officers). The Native Courts system was also abolished and the Native Regulations were relaxed supposedly to foster democratization. However, the success of these reforms was marginal because native land remained under communal ownership.

¹⁸ Later on (late 1970s to 1987), in the case of the Yalavou Cattle scheme, the Alliance government clung to traditionalism when it incorporated a merger of modern management and traditional leadership in the project's terms of reference.

Infrastructure projects absorbed 47 percent of the total CD&W grants received under DP1-DP4. DP4 and DP5 received less CD&W grants because they covered the eve of independence when there was a gradual withdrawal of support from the UK and a parallel increase in Fiji's external aid receipts from the European Economic Community (EEC), Canada and Australia. Loans from the IBRD provided the largest source of finance for DP 4 and 5. Between 1944 and 1968, Fiji received 9.1 million pounds (sterling) of CD&W Grants. From 1966 to 1970, CD&W Grants totalled \$11m. This constituted about 30 percent of the total capital revenue for that period.¹⁹ Table 4 shows the allocations on public sector investments for DP 1-4.

Although Development Plans 1-5 were not as elaborate as Development Plans 6-9, their capital investments were skewed toward the sugar industry and urban centres on Viti Levu to propel economic growth and boost revenue for the colonial government. DP1 concentrated on mineral resources and urban facilities on Viti Levu. The bulk of the capital projects for the first five years of DP1 (1949-1953) were urban infrastructure projects (public housing, medical facilities, town planning and other amenities) for Suva and Lautoka. Agricultural development *per se* was not accorded high priority in the first five-year period of DP1. This plan ignored the development needs of Vanua Levu. Although the second five-year period focused on agriculture, it was biased toward research facilities and extension services on Viti Levu. The two main agricultural stations on Viti Levu (Naduruloulou and Lautoka) were prioritized in this second five-year period while no such exercise was earmarked for Vanua Levu.²⁰

Table 4: Public Sector Investment Allocations, DPs 1-4

	1949-58 (DP 1)	1956-60 (DP 2)	1961-65 (DP 3)	1964-68 (DP 4)
Plan Size (\$ million)	4.2	9.5	12.2	15.0
Sectoral Allocations (%) :				
Economic Services	36.0	13.4	19.4	43.0
Social Services	25.4	25.3	15.8	23.0
Communications	34.2	60.8	50.0	20.0
Miscellaneous	4.4	0.5	14.8	14.0

(Source: Adapted from DP 6, 1970: 5)

¹⁹ DP 6, 1970: 5; Finance File 203/3/12; DP7 1975: 237.

²⁰ Although sub-stations for research and extension were already operant at Labasa and Savusavu, DP 1 focused on the principal agricultural stations at Naduruloulou and Lautoka (Viti Levu).

DP 2-5 replicated the pro-urban, pro-sugar, regional biases of the first plan. Between 1956 and 1961 (DP 2 and 3), priorities shifted from economic growth to social and communication services. Expenditures on social and communication services were still biased because they concentrated on urban telecommunications, sewerage and water supply systems (Suva and Lautoka), and trunk roads on Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. DP 3 touted a special emphasis on agricultural research stations throughout Fiji (DP 3, 1960: 9-10) but the prime objective was to ease resource extraction rather than the general upgrading of rural life. Consequently, capital investments in agriculture under DP3-5 remained skewed toward the urban centres and sugar industry on Viti Levu.

The Seaqaqa agricultural station in Labasa, established under DP 2 to prop up cocoa and copra projects on Vanua Levu, was not given equal priority with other agricultural stations on Viti Levu until the 1960s.²¹ The colonial administration only began to focus on Seaqaqa in DP 3 (1961-65). This low priority stemmed from the station's engagement with less lucrative cocoa and copra projects as well as the government's perception that since these projects melded into the traditional milieu of the participants, intervention must be minimal to avoid the disruption of the Fijian orthodoxy. The Post-War Development Committee articulated this position:

The natives in Fiji, the Gilbert and Ellis Islands and Tonga have highly developed systems of local governance. Control is exercised over the agricultural activities of the individual....I recommend that extension work among the native farmers should become the responsibility of the native administration authorities who employ native instructors for this purpose (*Post-War Planning and Development Committee*, 1946: 128).

Given the perception that cocoa and copra projects were semi-subsistence and blended in well with the communal order, the colonial government opted for a less intrusive approach to these projects. Basic infrastructure on and around these sites was not prioritized.

This pattern of uneven development prompted some political economy analysts to posit that core-periphery collaboration between Fiji's local elite and external capital engendered the problem.²² However, rural

²¹ Koronivia, Sigatoka and Naduruloulou stations on Viti Levu were prioritized. Note: the population for Vanua Levu in the late 1950s constituted only 30 percent of Fiji's total population.

²² Durutalo (1985) among others articulated this thesis to explain inequitable development in Fiji.

stagnation and its association with the rural-urban and regional gaps between the two main islands, was fostered by the urban and regional biases of the development plans (DP1-DP5). Driven by the colonial government's capitulation to demands by the Fijian ruling class for minimal disruptions to the Fijian orthodoxy and its semi-subsistence economy, the three main biases - pro-sugar, pro-urban and ethnic-preference - in capital development investments of DP1-DP5 produced two dimensions of unequal development in Fiji.

Within the two main islands, a significant rural-urban gap hinging on the urban prominence of one or two urban centres emerged. In Vanua Levu, the bias centred on Nasea in Labasa, developed during the colonial period. At the national level, the three biases in the colonial government's development plans also engendered a regional (core/periphery) gap between Vanua Levu and Viti Levu. This gap was fostered through unequal infrastructure development on the two islands under DP1-DP5.²³ Unequal capital investments by the colonial government on agricultural development exacerbated the growing disparity between the two islands. Viti Levu remained the hub of the booming sugar industry while marginal-income crop production predominated on Vanua Levu until the 1970s. Agricultural projects on Vanua Levu during the colonial period were heavily concentrated on copra and cocoa. Since most of the quasi-commercial projects in Vanua Levu operated within the ethnic Fijian village milieu or on land resettlement project sites, they were perceived to be self-sufficient on the basis of their semi-subsistence economies and ordained integration into the separate Fijian Administration. Infrastructure development for the project sites focused on easing the extraction and transportation of produce. The provision of roads and other infrastructure was, therefore, motivated by profit-driven resource extraction.

In forestry projects funded by CD&W grants, road development was governed by concessions to saw millers engaged in processing timber. Government subsidies were sometimes unevenly distributed to concession holders. This, together with the low priority given to basic (non-profit) rural infrastructure, retarded infrastructure development on Vanua Levu. Although cocoa projects on Viti Levu sat in the hinterlands and suffered a similar fate, the centralization of sugar production in the West-

²³ For instance, the bulk of the colonial government's investments in transport infrastructure under DP5 were skewed towards Viti Levu. DP5 (1966-1970) provided for the development of 453 main roads, 102 secondary roads, 253 country roads and 13 residential roads while only 210 main roads, 97 secondary roads, 41 country roads, and one residential road were earmarked for Vanua Levu (DP5, 1965: 2).

ern Division (Sigatoka, Nadi, Lautoka, Ba, Rakiraki) of Viti Levu helped garner capital investments on infrastructure in the cane belts. These generally benefited the surrounding rural areas in the cane belts of Viti Levu. It is, therefore, ironic that while the main set of CD&W grant-aided agricultural projects on Vanua Levu were driven by ethnic-preferences, this preferential thrust was not fully supported by basic infrastructure to uplift the living standards of the indigenous participants.

While the pro-urban and pro-sugar biases of DPs 1-5 skewed the colonial government's capital investment towards cane belts and urban centres on Viti Levu, the profit/income potentials of crop diversification projects involving the rural *vanua* remained depressed; the latter remained within the semi-subsistence and communal parameters. Rural decline, underdeveloped infrastructure and marginal agrarian earnings have provided potent 'push factors' from the rural *vanua*. In terms of rural stagnation due to unimproved basic infrastructure, the Department of Energy noted in its 2002 report that 1,000 out of a total of 1,170 Fijian villages still lacked electricity.²⁴ The UNDP Human Development Report (2000) also recorded fifty percent of the total population as having no access to safe, reticulated drinking water; rural residents form the vast majority of the people who were still without access to safe drinking water in 1999.

Rural ethnic Fijian communities, particularly in Vanua Levu and the Eastern Division, have been languishing on the periphery while the urban sprawl on Viti Levu has continued unchecked. A Summary Report on a resource assessment done by the Ministry of Economic Planning (in collaboration with Atkins Land and Water Management consultants) for western Vanua Levu in 1980 noted this regional bias:

Vanua Levu is characterized as an economically depressed area... In addition to being small, the workforce has limited management and technological skills. The region is clearly disadvantaged and is without the means to sustain rapid economic development (AID 42/8-II-I, Volume 1).

The Alliance government also acknowledged this regional disparity in its plan, the DP7 (1975: 83):

In order to have a more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic and social development, government will focus attention more on the inland parts of the main island of Viti Levu, the inaccessible parts of Vanua Levu and the outer islands.

²⁴ *Daily Post* 27 November 2002: 2. These figures do not include recent rural electrification projects successfully completed by the SDL government between 2001 and 2006. The latest statistics on the rural sector are not yet.

The two main urban centres on Vanua Levu (Labasa and Savusavu) did not 'take-off' until the Alliance government established the Seaqaqa sugarcane scheme (1974) and the Dreketi rice project (1980s) to upscale agricultural incomes in the region.

In retrospect, the colonial government's capitulation to the traditionalism of the Fijian ruling class shaped a rural development agenda that resisted the full integration of the rural *vanua* with the modern economy.²⁵ The Alliance government inherited this approach to rural development. Instead of opting out of this legacy, it chose to travel down the same fraught path, attempting to align the agenda with its five-year plans (DP6–DP9). The rural growth centre concept promoted in the early 1980s embraced an ambition to upgrade rural areas of potential through infrastructure, government services and incentives but the government's stance did not deviate much from the colonial government's approach. Thirty three of the thirty five rural growth centre proposals targeted rural ethnic Fijians. Despite the government's attempt to foster some semblance of multiracial tolerance in its rhetoric, its rural development policies favoured ethnic Fijians. The majority of requests to overseas aid donors for rural projects adhered to ethnic-preference, negating the principle of multiracialism which the Alliance promoted at the national level.

Given that the Alliance was led and supported by traditional Fijian leaders, there was perhaps no option but to continue with traditionalism and ethnic-preference to appease the ethnic Fijian segment and the Fijian ruling class. It would have been political suicide for the Alliance government to implement radical changes to the *status quo*. The politics of compromise and its policy framework for the transitional period following independence required the Alliance government to tread with care on matters relating to indigenous Fijian interests. The Alliance government's adherence to traditionalism and ethnic-preference was, therefore, politically expedient, driven by a certain amount of political realism.

Subverting historical truth in its discussion of the colonial government's response to Spate and Burns, the SDL government's twenty-year affirmative action plan claimed:

In an attempt to address the socio-economic problems of indigenous Fijians identified by these studies, government, as early as 1960, implemented a development plan for the ensuing decade which emphasized communications and agricultural development.... At the same time, there was a relaxation of the

²⁵ Traditionalism undervalued infrastructure development for rural indigenous communities engaged in ethnic-preference projects.

rigid Fijian regulations, and the *galala* plantation was enthusiastically encouraged to create a new society of indigenous Fijians who were market oriented and free from restrictive communal orientations (Fiji Government, 2002: 41).

This attempt to gloss over the colonial government's insipid attempts at reforming the Fijian Administration is ahistorical. It misrepresents colonial policies and ignores the politics involved. The Council of Chiefs' vehement opposition to *galala* is well documented in the minutes of the Council of Chiefs meetings (1940-1969). The colonial government took its cue from the chiefs' council and did nothing to truly democratize the Fijian Administration.²⁶ The Fijian orthodoxy and its traditionalist ethos remained unreformed during the Alliance tenure. Numerous expensive reviews of the Fijian Administration have been carried out, the most recent in 2002 by the multinational accounting firm Price Waterhouse. These reviews have been costly exercises, largely in futility.

Allusions to a growing socio-economic disparity between the indigenous and Indo-Fijian populations not only rationalized ethnic-preference in rural development, it also fuelled the anti-Indian propaganda of ethnic Fijian leaders. This, in turn, mandated traditionalism. In her discussion of the political posturing by the Fijian chiefly establishment to maintain its hegemony, Lawson aptly describes the ethnic dimension of Fijian traditionalism: 'One of the most important means by which the chiefly establishment had reinforced its political position was to instil in the Fijian people generally a sense of unity in opposition to the Fiji Indians...' (1990: 795).

Following the 1946 census which showed that the Indo-Fijian population had surpassed the ethnic Fijian segment, some colonial officials and ethnic Fijian leaders began to allege an Indian threat against indigenous Fijian interests. Between 1946 and 1966, colonial officials and ethnic Fijian leaders frequently drew attention to the advancing numerical disparity.²⁷ At the Council of Chiefs meeting in 1948, the Governor expressed concern that while ethnic Fijians numbered 122,749, the Indo-Fijian population totalled 128,374 out of Fiji's 1948 population of

²⁶ The long-standing collaboration between the colonial government and the Fijian ruling class since Cession was an inevitable 'given' in Britain's indirect rule policy. Indirect rule saw similar collaborative scenarios being played out in other British colonies as well.

²⁷ An Ordinance, passed in 1947 to restrict the influx of people intending to settle, was a move to curb this numerical disparity. This was propped up by the launching of ethnic-preferences with the Cooperative Societies Ordinance in the same year.

273,977.²⁸ Similar references were made by colonial officials, resident Europeans and ethnic Fijian leaders to instigate anti-Indian sentiments and rationalize ethnic-preferences. Instead of accepting blame for keeping their own people back from economic progress, the Fijian ruling class has been exploiting the Indo-Fijian segment as a convenient scapegoat for Fiji's political problems including the economic backwardness of the rural *vanua*.

The Alliance government embraced the politics of compromise, which provided some semblance of multiracial tolerance to the concept of equity in the development plans (DPs 6-9). The latter was loosely defined as 'achieving a more equitable distribution of income between the rural and urban areas'. Consequently, the overarching thrust for rural development in DP 6-DP 9 touted diametrically opposed core objectives: multiracialism and ethnic-preference.²⁹ DP 6 (p. 19) articulated this paradox:

Development Plan VI seeks to address itself to two problems which are peculiar to Fiji: the need to build a multiracial society and the need for integration of a country which is rather widely dispersed geographically. The pursuit of these objectives will of course in part lead along the same paths as efforts to remedy income-disparities and the rural-urban imbalance. In addition, special efforts will need to be made to bring subsistence farming into cash economy and to improve transportation and communication between the centres and the outlying islands.

This reference to multiracialism and the need to transform subsistence farming into commercially viable ventures remained rhetorical because the majority of rural project proposals prioritized by the Alliance were underpinned by ethnic preferences and traditionalism. In February, 2006, the Chairman of the Council of Chiefs (Ratu Ovini Bokini) decried comments by the Fiji Labour Party leader, Mahendra Chaudhry, that 'most people were still underprivileged because of traditional and cultural constraints'. He considered this an affront to the Great Council Chiefs.³⁰ This contemporary example of resistance to democratization by the Fijian

²⁸ Legislative Council debates 1948.

²⁹ Fifteen rural advisory councils were established in late 1969 to administer development projects for non-ethnic-Fijian segments. This development embodied a desire by the outgoing colonial administration and the incoming Alliance government to promote multiracialism. The provincial and district offices had been administering the rural *vanua* much earlier than these advisory councils.

³⁰ These comments were made at a rally of the People's Coalition Party a week before Ratu Ovini's retort (*The Fiji Times*, 24 February 2006).

ruling class signifies that traditionalism persists. Goldsworth argues that 'to get development right, it is necessary to get the politics right' (1988: 505). The Fijian ruling class needs to acknowledge the antithesis between traditionalism and sustainable rural development and accept reforms to the Fijian orthodoxy that may unlock the optimum potentials of the rural *vanua*.

Fiji at the Crossroads in 1970: Traditionalism vs Commercialization

When Fiji gained independence in 1970, traditionalism and ethnic-preferences in rural development had produced the following scenarios. Sugarcane, with full commercial orientation and majority (over 80 percent) Indo-Fijian participation, was the only lucrative crop in the agricultural sector. Rice, which held promise as a profitable crop for import substitution, was also mainly produced by Indo-Fijian farmers. Ethnic-Fijian participation in rice production remained marginal. Less lucrative crops like copra, bananas, cocoa, maize, root crops, and yaqona (*piper methysticum*) mainly involved semi-subsistence, smallholder and village-based production. In his study of land-use patterns in Fiji, Ward noted the basic orientation of village production:

... the average villager is not a full-time farmer although he is in fact dependent solely on his farming. Labour within the village is unspecialized and its efficiency is thereby reduced. In most villages, except those closes to urban centres and where commercialism has penetrated deepest, traditional principles of kinship still govern labour mobilization (1965: 196).

Census data show that participation in these two different types of agricultural activities (commercial/plantation-based versus quasi-commercial/village-based) was clearly ethnically-demarcated.

Was there a way out of this predicament other than continuing with ethnic-preference and traditionalism? Were there more lucrative crops for diversification projects involving the rural *vanua*? If yes, would they have maximized returns in a communal/village production base? These important questions were not adequately addressed by the Alliance government in its approach to rural development.³¹ Ward was overly optimistic about

³¹ A call was made in June 2007 by an attendee at the Fiji Institute of Accountants Congress for the strengthening of village-based production units as a means of improving agricultural sustainability (*Fiji Times*, 18/6/2007: 4). Such an exercise will need to consider the key constraints to production efficiency and profitability that are embedded in village-based and communal ventures.

the future of several colonial diversification crops involving ethnic-Fijian participation:

In terms of the relative contributions of the major cash crops to the colony's economy and to the area of land in use, the importance of the lesser crops such as bananas...and market garden crops, is likely to increase. New tree crops such as cocoa will also become more important (1965: 246).

The collapse of cocoa, banana and many other overseas-funded diversification projects in the 1970s and beyond negated this optimism. DP7 (1975: 1) aptly summarizes one reality of Fiji:

Fiji's economic situation has long been dominated by three major problems: dependence on one crop (sugar); dependence upon the outside world for trade, capital and expertise; [and the] rigidity of economic and ethnic divisions. The story of Fiji's economic development is largely a story of her efforts to overcome these problems.

This observation is pertinent as the approach to rural development mooted by the colonial government and perpetuated by the Alliance had its political roots in ethnically-demarcated modes of production. Calculating agricultural land use by ethnic Fijians based on the area under bananas and root crops in the 1960s, Ward deduced that 48.3 percent of all land used for agricultural and pastoral purposes was farmed by ethnic Fijians and that village production was their popular mode (1965: 195). Since traditionalism privileged communal land tenure, accessibility to arable lands remained limited as over 83 percent of all lands in Fiji were inalienable native lands. This produced the twin problems of extreme over-use of scarce land for intensive sugarcane farming and the under-use of native land for more profitable and commercial agricultural production.

At independence, Fiji was at the crossroads: to proceed with the four-pronged approach (*vakamatanitu*, *vakavanua*, traditionalism and ethnic-preference) and perpetuate its problematic impacts on the rural *vanua*, or to turn a new leaf and fully embrace modernity and multiracialism with concomitant land and local governance reforms to spur an increased integration of the rural *vanua* into the modern economy. The latter would have required a genuine democratization of the Fijian Administration and the relaxation of land tenure laws. The other path spelled the continuation of the Fijian dilemma and its draconian stranglehold on the rural *vanua*. The Alliance government chose to continue with the Fijian dilemma. This choice doomed several overseas-aided export diversification and import substitution projects which the Alliance enthusiastically

pursued in the 1980s.³² These projects did not do away with the contradictions posed by *vakamatanitu*, *vakavanua*, traditionalism and ethnic preferences. The collapse of most of these projects signifies a ‘revolving door’ syndrome in Fiji’s rural development history: mistakes of the past kept repeating themselves.

While the diversification projects of the colonial period embraced semi-subsistence, the Alliance government flaunted the rhetoric on increasing commercial orientation of such projects. DP7 stated this goal:

The sector with the largest labour force is at present agriculture. A large proportion of its labour force is working for subsistence rather than commercial agriculture. In order to ensure increasing incomes for farmers agriculture must become increasingly commercial (DP7, 1975: 6).

However, policy denied such rhetoric because the proposals for diversification and import substitution projects submitted to overseas aid donors from 1976 to 1987 reflected the government’s half-hearted commitment to full commercialization. The terms of reference for many of these projects entertained aspects of traditionalism, either merging modern and traditional management in a *galala* scheme or pushing for communal/village production.

The terms of reference for the Australian-funded Yalavou Beef project embodied the ‘Fijian Dilemma’. While the project pushed for *galala*, it co-opted local Fijian chiefs on the Yalavou Rural Development Board (YRDB). This decision to marry modern management and traditional leadership proved disastrous in the long run as farmers were still grid-locked to the influence of their chiefs emanating from the YRDB. This grandiose scheme for producing ‘mini-capitalist’ Fijian farmers sat on the brink of collapse by the late 1990s.³³

In the case of village cocoa projects, the Alliance government was more blatant in its promotion of semi-subsistence production: ‘This program is to enhance the village cocoa development rather than a plantation approach....’ (AID 45/I-I: 304).

³² These projects included: Yaqara Pastoral and Yalavou Beef schemes, Makogai Sheep, Korotolutolu Basin, Pigeon-pea, Batiri Citrus and several cocoa and coffee projects.

³³ Corruption and financial mismanagement by local chiefs co-opted into the YRDB was highlighted in 1998 when the Yalavou Project sat on the brink of bankruptcy. Several other exclusionary livestock projects (Makogai Sheep, and Tilivalevu and Uluisaivou cattle schemes) which embraced traditionalism by having overlapping boundaries with surrounding village, have similarly failed.

To break into the international market and compete effectively with other major cocoa exporters, cocoa cultivators require optimum production efficiency. Cocoa projects in Fiji did not stand a chance given their communal participation and traditionalist parameters. The Alliance government failed to consider this in its push for the communal approach in cocoa and other overseas-aided ethnic-preference projects. DP6 (1970: 19) recognized that the constraints of traditionalism were entrenched and institutionalized:

...agriculture, which is still the predominant economic activity, presents the greatest problems for resource development. This is partly because in Fiji...the institutional factors that need to be mobilized and transformed are difficult to change.

Instead of taking the bull by the horns to address problems of resource allocation and its constraints entrenched in land tenure and traditionalism, the Alliance government shied away from the issue and diverted attention to its ambitions to promote agricultural development as the vehicle for rural development. Debates on traditionalism have continued to the present but recent calls for a revival of import substitution and improvements in Fiji’s export sector should consider the weaknesses of past agricultural diversification projects.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on the predicament of the rural *vanua* and the core elements of Fiji’s state-led rural development agenda. The element of continuity in Fiji’s rural development history was also probed to highlight the ‘revolving door’ complex in that history. The paper also examined the underlying political tenets informing rural development policies in the colonial period and during the Alliance tenure to provide lessons for the future. Policies for agricultural diversification (boosting the export sector and import substitution) and raising rural incomes in Fiji will need to address the antithesis between traditionalism with its semi-subsistence and Fijian orthodoxy constraints, and modernity and its pre-conditions for democratization and increased integration with the modern economy.

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File Reference	File Name	Period
AID 45/I - I	Australian 3 Year Aid Program	1977 - 1980
AID 45/10/2-I	Yalavou Beef Development	1977 - 1982
AID 42/8-II Part I	National projects: LOME II	1980-1982

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